This paper argues that foreign direct investment into economies with credit market imperfections may have a significant effect on the dynamics of the domestic growth process: entrepreneurs who are agents for social mobility and innovation may be crowded out. Thus the domestic economy may be prevented from developing capacity to absorb positive externalities of foreign investment, e.g. by under-investing in human capital. Moreover, domestic dependence on the foreign economy may appear as the domestic economy's ability to recover from shocks to foreign capital supply is seriously harmed. Indeed the latter result is consistent with preliminary empirical evidence in that we find recovery after sudden stops to be prolonged in economies where both past exposure to foreign direct investments had been high and creditor protection weak.
Introduction
Sheer prevalence of foreign direct investment and the effort spent in many economies to attract a part of it indicate that the perceived benefit surpasses the mere provision of a scarce input. Indeed it has been argued that foreign investment entails positive externalities on the host economy, for instance through technological spill-overs or efficiency gains by increased competition (see e.g. Fosfuri et al., 2001, Markusen and Venables, 1999, among others) . These effects might be expected to be most pronounced for relatively backward economies (Findlay, 1978) .
Empirically, however, the overall effect of foreign direct investment on an economy's growth appears to be somewhat ambiguous and highly dependent on host country characteristics (see the survey by De Mello, 1997) . MayerFoulkes and Nunnenkamp (2005) find that US foreign direct investment contributes to convergence towards US income levels only for countries with a relatively high per capita income ex ante, whereas the effects on middle and low income economies turn out to be adverse. The same holds for investigations into specific channels such as productivity spill-overs from foreign to domestic firms (see the survey by Görg and Greenaway, 2004) . Aitken and Harrison (1999) analyze panel data from Venezuela and find a small net impact on plant productivity which appears to be seized entirely by joint ventures involving multinationals. Borensztein et al. (1998) find that foreign direct investment seems to be particularly effective when the host country is endowed with sufficient human capital; in the studies by Alfaro et al. (2004) and Hermes and Lensink (2003) this seems to be the case when local financial markets are sufficiently developed.
In line with this last observation we propose a theoretical dynamic analysis of foreign direct investment when source and sink economy differ only in the degree of capital market frictions. To this end we employ an occupational choice growth modelà la Banerjee and Newman (1993) which we augment by allowing for two economies. In our model convergence to a steady state with industrial production requires the presence of debt-financed entrepreneurs. Since production is stochastic, debt-financed firms default with positive probability and pay relatively high success wages. Setting up a firm requires an indivisible investment, yet collateral is required to obtain credit. This leads to a pecuniary intergenerational externality: success wages are high enough to provide all firm members' offspring with sufficient endowment to become entrepreneurs. When allowing for foreign direct investment, these agents are crowded out by foreign firms who have a competitive ad-vantage due to access to a more developed credit market. 1 This alters the dynamics persistently as income from certain wages in a foreign firm does not leave enough bequest for a worker's offspring to become an entrepreneur. That is, foreign direct investment removes upward social mobility.
Furthermore, foreign direct investment tends to increase workers' payoffs while decreasing entrepreneurs' payoffs. Hence political acceptance of foreign direct investment increases as the pivotal agent's wealth decreases, i.e. when extending the franchise to the poor. Calculating net capital flows we find that positive net portfolio investment from the domestic into the foreign economy outweighs net foreign investment which agrees with the observation by Lucas (1990) . Intuitively, multinationals incorporate and collect capital on the more developed capital market, that is in the foreign economy.
Two extensions show that the effect on the wealth distribution dynamics may have real consequences. Consider first positive externalities in education acquisition. Since wealth and human capital become complementary due to the credit market friction, crowding out domestic entrepreneurs may discourage domestic education acquisition. In effect a regime emerges such that all higher education is provided in the foreign economy, aggregate output and average education are higher in the foreign economy. This may be more efficient than autarky, if capital market frictions are severe enough. For intermediate cases autarky dominates as exploiting externalities while relying on an imperfect credit market becomes efficient. If domestic credit market quality is close to the foreign one there exists an equilibrium such that education is acquired by all agents in both economies.
Second we show that a decrease in foreign direct investment (for instance in a sudden stop) may lead to a drop in domestic output. The longer the domestic economy is exposed to foreign investment the sharper the drop and the longer the time to recuperate. Preliminary results suggest that this prediction appears to be supported in the data. We use a sample of about 80 sudden stops (as classified by Calvo et al., 2006) in 32 countries between 1980 and 2000. Indeed the interaction of past FDI inflow and weakness of creditor protection (from Djankov et al., 2007) is positively correlated with the probability that the recovery takes place only after more than 3 years. 2 1 De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) offer some evidence for such a contemporaneous crowding out in an industrialized country, Belgium.
2 While the result does appear to be robust to a number of specifications and controls, the empirical part is still very much in progress. We omit the tables in the present version Related theoretical literature includes the contribution by Grossman (1984) . He shows in a static setting with risk averse agents that foreign direct investment may serve as an insurance device and efficiently crowd out domestic entrepreneurs. The argument closest to ours has been put forward by Young (1991) . He argues that opening the domestic market to foreign trade may induce poor economies to specialize in less profitable and less advanced sectors to their detriment. Matsuyama (2004) considers a model that allows for inequality of economies despite capital market integration. His argument relies on the absence of foreign direct investment, however. Balcão Reis (2001) puts forward the argument that foreign direct investment might reduce domestic welfare as profits are expatriated.
The paper starts by introducing the model framework in Section 2. In Section 3 we develop the baseline model of the domestic economy in autarky, whereas we allow for foreign investment in Section 4. Sections 5 and 7 analyze the effects of scarcity of foreign firms and sudden stops. In section 6 an extension considers incentives to invest in human capital while Section 8 concludes. The more cumbersome proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Model

Agents
In each period t the domestic economy is populated by a continuum of agents I D . Let I D be a closed subset of the real line. An Agent i is born with initial wealth ω i . Denote the density function of the domestic wealth distribution in period t by G D t (ω). Agents obtain utility from consumption c t of the single good at the end of their lives, and from bequests to their offspring b t according to the utility function u = c 1−β t b β t where β ∈ (0, 1) is the bequest share. That is, agents are risk-neutral in income y t as u = δy t with δ = β β (1 − β) 1−β . Bequests and thus endowments of an agent's offspring are given by y t+1 = b t = βy t .
Production
The single good is produced in subsistence or in firms. Subsistence yields an income of s > 0 and can also be interpreted as self-employment not of the paper, since in our opinion further checks are needed to confirm our findings. requiring a capital investment. A firm is run by an entrepreneur who pays a setup cost of K units of the single good. To produce output a firm needs also the presence of M workers. 3 Production is stochastic yielding output r 1 K with probability q and r 0 K < r 1 K with probability 1 − q. Denote the expected rate of return byr = r 0 + q(r 1 − r 0 ). Denote the wage payable to each worker by v.
Credit Market and Firm Default
There exists a credit market that allows agents to lend at the world market interest rate r 0 < r < r 1 , for instance because there exists a divisible asset paying out a rate of return r with certainty. 4 There arise frictions in the credit market due to a twofold moral hazard on the side of borrowers. Entrepreneurs who borrow an amount D have the opportunity (i) to announce that the project's rate of return is r 0 when it is really r 1 , that is to default strategically, and (ii) to take the loan D and flee from their creditors.
To avoid strategic default creditors have the possibility to verify the state of the project at inspection cost ∆ > 0. In this case credit contracts take the form of a standard debt contract (see Gale and Hellwig, 1985) and inspection occurs if and only if the borrower defaults. In case of default the firm's remaining assets are seized by the creditor. Entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability of firms. A debt contract further specifies the loan size D and the repayment r D D. The market for loans is competitive so that rD = qr D D + (1 − q)(r 0 K − ∆) and thus for D ∈ (r 0 K; K) the borrowing interest rate is given by
Note that strategic default can also occur vis a vis the workers who may be denied the wage v. Hence, in order to avoid this labor contracts also specify that inspection occurs if and only if the entrepreneur defaults on wages. To keep the analysis tractable we assume that Assumption 1 Inspection cost are paid by the project, r 0 K = ∆.
3 Letting factor inputs vary in firms by e.g. endogenizing M considerably increases complexity of equilibrating the labor market. Moreover, this introduces additional distortions in production technology choice (see e.g. Gall, 2005) , blurring the focus of this paper. 4 Endogenizing the interest rate increases notation while not adding any result of interest to our analysis. In particular, the steady state allocations will not differ.
So the order of creditors does not matter and inspection can be financed out of the project's return. Moreover, r D = r/q. Concerning (ii) an entrepreneur i who borrows an amount D has the opportunity to flee from the creditor. Doing so the entrepreneur may use D to setup a firm, although the necessity of clandestine operation reduces the project's return in case of success to a fraction δ. This is for instance due to the need to bribe officials and to hide output, which may distort production. To counter this moral hazard banks may demand collateral in form of a deposit ω * . Independently of the loan size D entrepreneurs find it profitable to stay if
supposing ω i ≥ ω * and taking into account that the entrepreneur may have sufficient funds to pay workers' wages with certainty thereby defaulting with probability zero. Hence, the minimal collateral requirement is
The collateral requirement ω * therefore determines the minimum wealth level necessary to become an entrepreneur. Note that ω * can be chosen freely by adjusting δ. Note that for sufficient wealth, that is
, it is profitable to provide the firm with sufficient equity as to prevent default and the associated inspection cost altogether. Such an equity firm has to fund upfront investment K and payment of the expected wage in a debt-financed firm qv even in case of the project's failure.
Assumption 2 Let the following parametrical assumptions hold. (i) Production in firms is
(ii) Locally increasing returns to scale: βr < 1 < βr. Part (i) is straightforward to make the problem interesting. The remaining parts serve to ensure that debt-financed entrepreneurs are indeed imposing intergenerational pecuniary externalities on their workers. 5 Combining (iii) and (iv) impliesr
q s which by (ii) implies 1 − βr > q. Note that (1 − βr)/(r − r) < qr 1 − r by (ii) and the last fact. Moreover, we assume that in the initial period t = 0 debt-financed entrepreneurs are present but scarce in the domestic economy to avoid a trivial poverty trap.
Assumption 3 In the initial period t 0 the measure of potential entrepreneurs in the domestic economy is small but positive,
Similarly, to generate a tractable (monotone) wealth dynamics we impose the following additional assumptions.
This supposes that the bequest ratio is relatively low in comparison to expected opportunity cost of setting up an equity firm, and that each firm has at least one successful worker on average. These assumptions are not strictly necessary for our result, however, they facilitate mathematical analysis considerably implying for instance a monotone evolution of endowments.
Timing
The timing of events in the economy is as follows. At the beginning of a period t the labor and capital markets open and agents choose capital investment and occupation. The labor market is competitive and cleared by an expected wagev * t that equates labor demand and supply. Then production takes place and projects' success or failure realizes. At the end of a period t agents are paid out, decide on bequests and consume.
The Domestic Economy in Autarky
Let us start by analyzing the growth path of the domestic economy in absence of foreign direct investment. First we need to determine the labor market outcome.
Labor Market
Expected earnings of an agent i in the domestic economy are then rω i + s if in subsistence, rω i + qv if working in a debt-financed firm, and rω i + (r − r)K − (1 − q)∆ − qM v if becoming an entrepreneur and having to borrow. Denote the expected wage in a debt-financed firm byv = qv. Agents with
may become self-financed entrepreneurs by setting up an equity firm that avoids default which yields expected earnings rω i + (r − r)K − Mv. Define the minimum wealth necessary to set up an equity firm as
The expected wagev is determined on the labor market. Labor demand is given by the measure of agents choosing to be entrepreneurs at a given expected wagev:
Labor supply is the measure of agents choosing to work for expected wagē v:
That is, the expected market wagev * is given bȳ
Hence, a labor market equilibrium exists and measure 1 − G D (ω * * (v * )) of firms pay expected market wagev * with certainty whereas all other firms pay eitherv * /q with probability q or 0 with probability 1 − q.
Dynamics
In order to keep the analysis tractable we focus on the dynamic evolution of the measure of potential entrepreneurs in debt-financed firms, that is agents with ω i ∈ [ω * , ω * * (v * )) and the measure of agents too poor to meet the collateral requirement, that is
If workers are abundant the market wage isv * = s, the measure of debtfinanced firms is 
Lemma 1 Letv
Proof: In Appendix.
The lemma states that for any initial condition with a strictly positive measure of potential debt-financed entrepreneurs, after a finite number of periods poor agents will cease to be abundant, that is G D T (ω * ) < M/(M + 1) for some t 0 < T < ∞. In this case the market wage has to adjust, of course.
and all firms are equity firms.
This lemma implies that forv
the measure of the poor is weakly increasing as all agents rich enough to become debt-financed entrepreneurs bequeath less wealth than their endowments. Hence, neither
are compatible with a steady state of the wealth distribution if there is a positive measure of agents that may become debt financed entrepreneurs in period t 0 . The following proposition characterizes all steady states in autarky.
Proposition 1 (Autarky) In the domestic economy in autarky an invariant wealth distribution exists. In a steady state either
, the measure of debt financed firms is
. By Lemma 2 initial endowments of agents with ω i,t > ω * are then decreasing in time, and strictly so in a finite number of periods. This means there exists in finite number of periods T such that the measure 1
. Using Corollary 4 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) existence of an invariant wealth distribution can be shown analogously to Aghion and Bolton (1997) . Hence, a steady state market wage exists and is given byv 
Foreign Direct Investment
In this section we allow for direct investment by foreign firms. Foreign direct investment is modeled as letting a foreign agent set up a firm in the domestic economy. There is a continuum of foreign agents I F endowed with unit Lebesgue measure. A foreign multinational firm is a subset of I F with positive measure. This modeling choice serves both to capture the different sizes of multinational companies and domestic entrepreneurial firms and, more importantly, to enable multinational firms to perfectly diversify production risk. The crucial property of multinational firms is that they are less likely to default than domestic debt financed entrepreneurial firms. This we find a plausible assumption. Multinational firms have access to the same technology as domestic firms. The only difference lies in access to credits. Moreover, due to better law enforcement in the foreign country evasion is very costly, δ F <r −r r , so that foreign individuals do not face wealth constraints when borrowing. Since projects' outcomes are independent foreign firms never default.
Labor Market
Multinationals compete for workers so that they earn zero profits. The domestic labor demand thus becomes
Domestic labor supply is unchanged from (2)
Hence, the labor market equilibrium under foreign direct investment has
Dynamics
Using the fact that agents that are able to become debt financed entrepreneurs find it more profitable to work and Lemma 2 some properties of the steady state with foreign direct investment can be identified. Moreover, Proposition 2 admits the computation of net capital flows from and into the domestic economy. Indeed portfolio investment flows from the domestic to the foreign economy and exceeds the reverse flow of direct investment consistent with empirical observations (see Lucas, 1990 , and a subsequent literature).
Proposition 3 (Capital Flows) In any period t foreign direct investments are positive and weakly increasing in t. In the steady state the capital account in the domestic economy is given by
Proof: Foreign direct investment in period t are given by
which must be strictly positive since
This means domestic demand for loans is 0 whereas domestic loan supply is ω F . Hence, the capital account in the domestic economy is given by
since βr > 1 > βr by assumption.
Comparison
Calculating and comparing wages and profits in the different steady states under autarky and foreign direct investment yields the following corollary. 
) strictly prefer foreign direct investment to autarky while the reverse holds for agents with ω i,t > ω * * (
).
This means allowing for foreign direct investment yields access to more developed financial markets and corporations. If labor markets are competitive efficiency gains are realized by domestic agents. This comes, however, at the expense of a change in the dynamics of the domestic wealth distribution. Figure 3 shows the difference in the dynamics of individual wealth. An individual may be in state poor (P ), potential debt-financed entrepreneur (D) or potential self-financed entrepreneur (S). These states correspond to initial wealth holdings ω i ∈ [0, ω * ], ω i ∈ (ω * , ω * * (v * )], and ω i ∈ (ω * * (v * , +∞). Given that the measure of agents in state P is less than one in the initial period, the assumption that βs > qω * and lemmata 1 and 2 imply that at least states P and D are recurrent. Therefore they have positive probability mass in the invariant measure. Introducing foreign direct investment crowds out domestic debt-financed entrepreneurs. These were responsible for positive transition probabilities from P to D. Note that now state P is absorbing. The measure of individuals in states S and D are converging to 0 since in every period a positive measure of agents leaves these states.
That is, in absence of frictionless financial markets individuals of intermediate wealth who become debt-financed entrepreneurs are agents for upward social mobility. Under autarky they ensure sufficient wealth concentration among sufficient agents such that capital market imperfections imposed for instance by collateral requirements cannot prevent indivisible investment. Foreign direct investment may completely remove upward social mobility from the domestic economy.
Barriers to Entry
In the analysis above we proposed a benchmark case in which free entry to the domestic economy ensured that rents from access to superior credit markets were competed away. We are now interested in a situation where foreign entrepreneurs are scarce on the domestic labor market, for instance due to barriers to entry. Suppose that the Lebesgue measure of foreign entrepreneurs that have access to the domestic economyÎ F , is sufficiently small, µ(Î F ) < 1/(M + 1) − (1 − G D (ω * )). Equalizing domestic labor supply (2) and demand (using an appropriate version of (1)) the market clearing domestic expected wage isv * = s.
Proposition 4 Suppose the measure of foreign entrepreneurs is µ(Î F ) < 1/(M + 1) and does not depend on time. In the steady state expected wage in the domestic economy is given byv
and the measure of debt-financed firms is strictly positive and
Proof: By Lemmata 1 and 2 wealth distributions such that 1
) cannot be part of steady state allocations. Since a steady state wealth distribution must exist as argued above it must involve a strictly positive measure of debt financed firms and an intermediate wage.
Note that the steady state wage with barriers to entry is lower than under full competition which allows foreign entrepreneurs to obtain a rent. On the other hand, comparing payoffs implied by Proposition 4 with those from autarky shows there are no losers once entrepreneurs are not scarce. Computing incomes yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (Comparison) Expected wage income and aggregate output are at least as high under foreign direct investment with barriers to entry as under autarky both in the steady state and in any period t. All domestic agents weakly prefer the steady state allocation under foreign direct investment with barriers to entry to the one under autarky.
This means that the identity of the pivotal agent in a suitable political economy setting determines the degree of openness to foreign direct investment and any subsequent adjustments of the domestic labor market equilibrium. A straightforward extension is for instance a median voter model that allows for extension of the franchise. This yields the prediction that openness to foreign investment increases as participation in the electoral process increases among the poor. This appears to agree with recent empirical observations that tend to find a positive relationship between foreign investment and measures of democratization, and political and civil rights (Harms and Ursprung, 2002) , and reversal of the relation after the second world war (Quinn, 2003) . 6 
Externalities
This section shows that there may arise real distortions if entrepreneurial activity confers positive externalities to the rest of the economy, for instance in the form of learning by doing, innovation, or human capital spillovers. Here we assume increasing returns to education acquisition by allowing for positive externalities in the human capital acquisition cost.
Suppose the success rate of return on capital invested in the risky project, r 1 depends on firm members' human capital. To keep the analysis tractable we proxy human capital acquisition by a discrete education choice e i ∈ {0; e L ; e H } with 0 < (M + 1)e L < e H to avoid multiple equilibria due to coordination failure. This can be thought of as the decision whether to acquire primary, secondary, or tertiary education. Acquiring education e i , comes at cost c(e i , e j ) = φ(e j )e i where e i is individual education choice and marginal cost φ(e j ) is positive and decreases in aggregate education in country j, e j = i∈I j e i di. Suppose that education causes only utility cost and no monetary cost. 7 The success rate of return on capital invested in the risky project is function ρ(e) of the firm members' education levels e. Letρ(e) = qρ(e) + (1 − q)r 0 denote expected return depending on education. To make our point with a minimum of notational complexity suppose there are only three possible outcomes ofρ(e):ρ(e) =r if e H ∈ e and 0 ∈ e,ρ(e) =ρ if e H ∈ e and 0 / ∈ e, andρ(e) = 0 otherwise. This is best interpreted as a technology that needs one highly educated individual as a developer, technician, or supervisor and output has decreasing returns to education of the remaining agents. Suppose further
Assumption 5 High education is profitable,rK > φ(0)e H , and education cost externalities satisfy
This implies that in both economies simultaneously measure 1/(M + 1) of agents may find it profitable to acquire tertiary education and the remainder acquires secondary education. 
(ii) Foreign direct investment: there exists a finite ∆ > 0 such that 
and domestic wages are smaller than foreign wages,v D <v F . Proof: In appendix. Proposition 5 states that under autarky returns to higher education are sufficiently large to create cost externalities for lower education. These make it profitable for workers to acquire some education leading to a steady state with expected market wagev * =
. In case of foreign investment properties of the domestic economy's steady state depend on the degree of credit market imperfections. Note first that in all foreign firms one member has high education and the remainder low education. If inspection cost in case of bankruptcy ∆ is high enough, highly educated foreign entrepreneurs compete for domestic workers and crowd out domestic debt financed entrepreneurs. This in turn makes investment in education unprofitable for domestic agents who become workers if the measure of domestic self-financed entrepreneurs is low enough. In case ∆ is low enough and there is a positive measure of domestic agents rich enough to become debt-financed entrepreneurs, to attract foreign entrepreneurs the domestic wage has to become so low that domestic agents find it profitable to invest both in high education and capital.
Part (iii) of the proposition enables a welfare comparison. If ∆ is high, the benefits of having access to a more efficient financial market outweighs the loss from under-education of domestic workers. For intermediate ∆ the reverse holds and the loss from under-education dominates. In case ∆ is sufficiently low, foreign entry does not adversely affect domestic education incentives if there are sufficiently many domestic agents rich enough to become entrepreneurs. This means that foreign direct investment benefits poor economies with very dysfunctional financial markets and economies that have a middle class and sufficiently developed financial markets. To the contrary, economies that have a high share of poor people and moderate financial market imperfections may be hurt by foreign direct investment.
Sudden Stops of Foreign Direct Investment
This section is concerned with a sudden regime change from competitive foreign direct investment to barriers to entry. This may be due to a rise in entry costs, political change, or exchange rate or foreign productivity shocks that require foreign firms to make profits on the domestic market. Moreover, foreign direct investment may decrease following a sudden stop. Empirical evidence suggests that decreases in FDI during a sudden stop typically appear to be small in comparison to drops in foreign portfolio investment (see for instance Levchenko and Mauro, 2007) . When departing from a competitive allocation, however, a small decrease of foreign direct investment may be accompanied by a large effect on domestic wages. If the duration of exposure to foreign direct investment was sufficiently long at the time of a sudden stop, the effects of a small decrease in foreign direct investment may be quite severe. Proof: Note that the market wage under competitive foreign direct investment isv * =r −r M +1 K and therefore by Lemma 2 wealth of all agents with ω i,t 0 ≥ ω * is strictly decreasing in time. This means ω i,t+1 < ω i,t for all i ∈ I D independently of success or failure of their firm's project. Moreover, the wealth transition is monotone conditional on success, ω i,t > ω h,t implies ω i,t+1 > ω h,t+1 if i was successful. Since initial period wealth is bounded we can denote by j the wealthiest individual in period t 0 , ω j,t 0 = max i∈I {ω i } and suppose j's firm is successful every period. Individual j's wealth ω j,t is a strictly decreasing sequence in t that converges to ω F . Hence ω j,t is Cauchy and we can find T < +∞ such that ω j,T < ω * . Since j was assumed to be successful every period this means that G D T (ω * ) = 1. That is, in period T there are measure 1/(M + 1) of foreign firms. A decrease of the measure of foreign entrepreneurs by implies that at wagesv T > s labor supply exceeds labor demand. Therefore the market wage isv T = s. By Lemma 1 this remains true for all periods t > t 0 + T as long as the measure of foreign firms remains below 1/(M + 1). The difference in domestic income between periods T and T − 1 is given by s −r
This proposition states that exposure to foreign direct investment incurs a risk of adverse real consequences should foreign investment be withdrawn suddenly. 8 Withdrawal may both decrease domestic factor market prices and reintroduce credit rationing thus reducing domestic income. Depending on elasticity of demand on the factor markets small reductions in foreign investment may cause severe effects. In the most extreme case the domestic economy may end up in a undesirable subsistence steady state. This may have reasons both in the domestic economy, say due to political risk, and in the foreign economy, due to productivity shocks of foreign workers.
Whenever domestic entrepreneurs are not fully crowded out there is a potential for a domestic output recovery that is accompanied by a positive current account. This has been described by Calvo et al. (2006) who call this phenomenon a "Phoenix Miracle". Domestic output recovery relies on debt-financed entrepreneurs whose measure is decreasing in time of exposure to foreign investment. Therefore the model predicts Phoenix Miracles to be more pronounced the less time has been spent in a foreign investment regime.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of foreign direct investment on the wealth dynamics of an economy with imperfect credit markets. Credit market imperfections assign debt-financed entrepreneurs an important role for the inter-temporal accumulation of capital. Foreign direct investment makes this occupation unprofitable thereby altering the dynamics of the domestic wealth distribution quite drastically. This distributional effect may have adverse real consequences when considering sudden withdrawal of foreign capital or the incentives to invest in human capital.
In particular in light of the extension allowing for education externalities a final remark is in order. A difference in capital market quality between the domestic and the foreign economy can also be interpreted as a difference in contracting technology. That is, foreign direct investment allows domestic workers to participate in the return to the superior technology. On the other hand, autarky enables domestic agents to realize the benefits of positive externalities. Our model implies that exposure to foreign direct investment decreases the stock of domestic entrepreneurs necessary to invigorate the human capital sector. That is, admitting foreign direct investment and thus relying on foreign technology has a persistent effect on future ability to accumulate domestic human capital. Hence, an existing distance to the technological frontier is likely to become permanent. This points to a straightforward extension of this paper in an endogenous growth framework a la Aghion et al. (2005) , where the crowding out implies a failure to build up absorptive capacity for technological spill-over in the sense of Nelson and Phelps (1966) . 
A Mathematical Appendix
B Empirical Appendix -First Results
Wage Variance and Foreign Direct Investment
Since this paper argues that foreign direct investment affects an economy's growth dynamics through the composition of wealth and income, a look at the evidence is in order. Some empirical work has been done on the effects of foreign direct investment on the domestic wage distribution, and typically finds that inequality increases as direct investments grow. Tsai (1995) and Choi (2006) examine effects of foreign direct investment on income inequality and find some evidence for a positive relationship, effects appear to vary in less developed countries, however. Other studies focus on the effects on wage inequality in developed and developing countries and tend to conclude that foreign direct investments correlate with an increase in the premium for higher education, thus potentially amplifying wage inequality (see Aitken et al., 1996, Feenstra and Hanson, 1997) . For an example from the developing, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) report that foreign owned firm in Malaysia generally pay higher wages; the wage premium for workers with higher education is twice as high as the one for lower educational attainment. Indeed this effect may translate into investments as Basu and Guariglia (2007) document positive correlation between foreign direct investment and both human capital inequality and growth rates in a cross country study. Hence, foreign owners seem to pay higher wages, and disproportionally so for higher educated workers, which may increase wage inequality. This is primarily a statement on the within firm wage variance, that is variation of payments differentiated by task. This does not necessary imply the same for variation of wages across firms. In particular, when insolvency is an issue due to imperfect domestic capital markets, wages in foreign owned firms may be expected to exhibit less variation across firms than in domestic firms. Since less research is available on variation of wages across firms depending on whether ownership is domestic or foreign we provide some statistics in the following.
We use data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for 27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries for the years 2001 and 2004. A first glance at the coefficient of variation shows that in 21 out of 24 countries with sufficient the coefficient of variation is higher for domestic firms. 9 In absolute terms we find that in all countries in the sample wages in domestic firms have a larger support than wages in foreign owned firms. Figure 4 shows the result of a quantile regression. Indeed foreign ownership seems to be positively correlated in particular for intermediate wages, giving rise to a parabola. Table B shows a regression of the average wage in a firm. Dependent variables are interaction terms for foreign owned and an indicator for whether or not a wage is in the 90 percent quantile. Indeed foreign ownership commands a wage premium (for-lo90). Moreover, the wage premium disappears for the top wages and turns negative for firms with foreign headquarters. Interestingly the negative effect of foreign ownership on high wages becomes less pronounced when controlling for access to finance (stock, fin-reearn), suggesting that among firm with better access to funding the negative rela-tionship of foreign ownership and top wages is dampened.
Recovery from Systemic Sudden Stops
Our empirical strategy requires identifying sudden stop episodes where recovery relied on domestic investment. We follow Calvo et al. (2006) to classify 33 systemic sudden stop episodes. In these episodes domestic investment rebounded before access to international capital markets was regained; Calvo et al. (2006) term this type of recovery a "Phoenix miracle". The description of a recovery after a withdrawal of foreign capital relying solely on domestic investment appears to match our model remarkably well. Due to lack of consistent data for controls we have to restrict our attention to 30 out of the 33 systemic sudden stop episodes classified by Calvo et al. (2006) . 10 We measure a country's degree of financial development by means of data on creditor rights which are taken from Djankov et al. (2007) (the variable is defined such that higher values correspond to a lower degree of financial development). FDI inflows are taken from the UNCTAD (2006). Moreover, we consider the following control variables: population size, real GDP, openness to trade (trade as a share of GDP), the private investments share of GDP, the terms of trade, and the inflation rate. Population size and real GDP reflect the market size of an economy and are expected to mitigate the impact of a sudden stop. Similarly, a higher degree of private investments, trade openness, and more beneficial terms of trade are associated with a quicker period of recovery while a higher level of inflation is expected to prolong this period. The first three variables are obtained from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006) , the last three from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Finally, we include regional dummy variables for Africa and Latin America as well as time dummies for the 1980s and 1990s.
We estimate a generalized negative binomial regression model with duration (in years) until output has returned to its pre-crises level as a dependent variable. The choice of model seems adequate since the distribution of durations appears to be well-represented by a Poisson-like process. Additionally this accounts for over-dispersion. 11 This distributional assumption is quite general and appears to be appropriate for our setting. Analogous to previous findings, we expect that the negative effect of higher foreign investments in the past on the number of years until a full recovery declines with a country's degree of financial development.
Results Table 3 lists the results for the generalized negative binomial regression model. That is, we analyze if past foreign investments increase the number of years until a full output recovery. We find that past foreign investment prolong the duration until a full output recovery when controlling for the interaction with creditor rights. The interaction term of past FDI and lack of creditor rights is positively associated with duration. Indeed positive effects of past FDI are swamped by the interaction term in countries with low creditor rights protection (CR ≥ 3). When adding time and region controls (using dummies for the decade and the regions Latin America and Africa) only the interaction term and creditor rights remain significant at any conventional level. When using the averages over the past decade rather than over five years (as in specification (1) - (4)), the interaction term loses its significance. As a robustness test we repeated the exercise reported in Table 3 but interacted past trade with creditor rights. In no case is the interaction term significant at any conventional level.
increases over time. This interdependence can lead to extra variation which is referred to as over-dispersion. Significance levels are set at 10%, 5% and 1%, and t-statistics in parenthesis. Always include a constant and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 1) Past FDI, population, real GDP and trade capture averages over the last ten years instead of five.
